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STOCK REDEMPTION FUNDED BY LIFE
INSURANCE
There are primarily two types of buy-sell agreements funded by
life insurance.' The first is called an entity plan under which the
corporation promises to buy and the shareholder obligates his estate
to sell the stock owned by the decedent at the time of death 2 This
comment will deal primarily with this type of plan but will occasion-
ally allude to the second type of plan, called the purchase agree-
ment. In the usual cross-purchase agreement each shareholder pur-
chases insurance on the life of the other shareholders and obligates
himself to use the proceeds to purchase the interest of the others
should they predecease him. The premiums may be paid either by the
corporation or the shareholders individually.
Normally both types of agreements are funded by life insurance
since this provides funds as soon as the corporation starts paying the
premiums, and the policies purchased also have cash or collateral
value. Because of the widespread use of life insurance in this area,
the discussion which follows will center on agreements which have
been so funded.
Under either the entity or the cross-purchase type plan, a trustee
may be used. Typically the trustee, with whom the shareholders have
deposited their stock, holds the insurance policies for the benefit of the
estate of the insured. Upon the death of the shareholder-insured, the
trustee collects the proceeds, pays them to the estate of the decedent,
and turns the decedent's stock over to the purchaser under the agree-
ment.3 At least one author has suggested that use of the trustee will
prevent creditors of the decedent or of the prospective purchaser from
I For good discussions of stock redemption funded by life insurance see Friedman
and Wheeler, Jr., "Stock Redemption Agreements Funded by Life Insurance," 37 Taxes
915 (1959); Lawthers, "Prunier Offers No Threat to a Sound Insured Buyout Plan,"
7 J. Taxation 2 (1957); Manheimer and Friedman, "Stock-Retirement Agreements-
The Prunier and Sanders Cases," 35 Taxes 567 (1957); Margolis, "Income Tax Aspects
of Executive-Stockholder Life Insurance Plans," N.Y.U. 19th Inst. on Fed. Tax 69, 76
(1961); Worthy, "Current Developments in Federal Taxation Affecting Life Insurance,"
A.B.A. Sect. Ins. N. and C. L. 142 (1958).
2 See Teske & Maier, "Stock Retirement Agreements Resurrected or the 'Tax
Collector's Bark Is Often Worse Than His Bite,'" 41 Marq. L. Rev. 358 (1957). In an
appendix to this article the authors set out a suggested form to be used as a guide in
drafting stock-purchase agreements of the entity variety.
3 Sample trusteed stock purchase plans can be found in I. Rabkin and Johnson,
Current Legal Forms With Tax Analysis, 927-69, 1600-66 (Supp. 1955).
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reaching the policy, its proceeds or the stock so long as it is in the
hands of the trustee.
4
However, a transfer of an insurance policy in trust, for the sole
purpose of collecting and distributing the proceeds to the stockholder,
would be dividend income to the stockholder measured by the cash
surrender value of the policies at the time of the transfer. This result
may be avoided if the corporation retains certain incidents of owner-
ship in the policy, such as the receipt of policy dividends, the right to
change the beneficiary, and the right to sell or hypothecate the policy.'
DETERMINATION OF PURCHASE PRICE
Once it is decided to enter a stock purchase agreement funded by
life insurance, a method for determining the price to be paid for the
stock at death must be adopted.7 A fixed price will not take account
of future fluctuations in the value of the stock so that it may be wise
to provide for changes at certain intervals subject to arbitration if
the parties fail to agree. If a fixed price is not set, provision should
be made regarding who is to pay any excess above the insurance
proceeds and who is to get the excess insurance proceeds in the event
the final price set is less than the proceeds from the insurance.'
Perhaps the most common method of fixing the purchase price in a
stock purchase agreement funded by life insurance is the formula
method. Under this type of plan the purchase price is normally based
upon the book value of the stock on a certain date. If book value is
used, the parties should carefully specify what is meant by book
value and the date as of which book value is to be computed.
Another problem inherent in the book value formula is whether or not
the insurance proceeds are to be included in the book value. Failure
to include the insurance proceeds in book value may result in great
inequities to the estate of the deceased shareholder particularly in the
case of a premature death when the proceeds received by the corpora-
tion are much greater than the asset value of the insurance policy on
4 See Laikin, "Settlement Options and Survivor-Purchase Agreements," 4 J. Am.
Soc'y C.L.U. 199, 205 (1950). However, if the corporation is insolvent the trust will
become illegal in states where an insolvent corporation cannot redeem its own stock
and corporate creditors would then be able to reach the insurance policy.
G Golden v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1940).
6 Ibid.
7 For a discussion of this problem with citation of authorities see Comment, "The
Use of Life Insurance To Fund Agreements Providing for Disposition of a Business
Interest at Death," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 687, 690 (1958). See also Forster, "Valuing a Busi-
ness Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale Agreement," 4 Stan. L. Rev. 325
(1952).
8 Comment, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 687, supra note 7.
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the corporate books. However, inclusion of the insurance proceeds in
book value will result in an increase in the amount of insurance
needed to fund the stock redemption agreement. In any event, only a
proportionate share of the proceeds is included in the purchase price
of the stock, based upon the decedent's share ownership.9
PURPosEs
There are certain very definite purposes served by stock redemp-
tion plans. A plan of this type assures continuity of the business
without interference from new interests. Furthermore, a plan of this
type guarantees the estate of the deceased shareholder a ready
market for his stock at a price fixed by those having the greatest
familiarity with the business.10 Another benefit to be derived from a
plan of this nature is the fixing of the valuation of the stock for pur-
poses of estate and inheritance taxes." Also there is provided a
definite fund with which to redeem the stock.
The remarks that follow will be applicable mainly to the closely
held corporation where harmony of management can be so easily
upset by the sale of stock to an outside interest. The buy-sell agree-
ment is also used by partnerships, but the complex problems of the
partnership area are not within the scope of this article. 2
PAYMENT OF PREMIIMS AS TAXABLE INCOME TO STOCKHOLDER
In most cases it is impractical for the shareholders of a close
corporation to pay for the life insurance needed to fund a stock-
purchase agreement. "The premiums on these policies are usually paid
directly by the corporation because the main source of liquid assets
to the shareholders is taxable dividend and compensation dollars. This
all works out well as long as the premium payments by the corporation
are not taxed to the shareholders on one theory or another.
At the outset it should be understood that premiums paid by the
corporation for life insurance on the lives of its stockholders are not
deductible by the corporation. The deduction is disallowed under
9 See Davis, "Business Purchase Agreements," 94 Trusts & Estates 284, 328 (1955).
10 For a discussion of the benefits of these plans see White, "Business Insurance,"
87-90, 193-201, 434-40 (2d ed. 1956).
11 See Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938); Lomb v. Sugden, 82
F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Estate of Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954) ; Estate of Ray -E.
Tompkins, 13 T.C. 1054 (1949).
12 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 736 and the regulations thereunder dealing with
the sale of a partnership interest. For a good discussion of the income tax aspects of
the partnership entity plan see Comment, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 687, supra note 7, at 697. See
also Egger, "Sales of Partnership Interests and Death or Retirement of a Partner," N.Y.U.
15th Inst. on Fed. Tax 115 (1957).
[Vol. 23
COMMENT
§ 264(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code if the corporation is
either directly or indirectly a beneficiary under the policy. It will be
necessary for the corporation to retain some interest in the insurance
in order for the stockholder to avoid constructive dividend treatment
on the premiums paid by the corporation so the corporation will be at
least an indirect beneficiary and will lose the deduction.
Under the doctrine of constructive dividends, a stockholder must
pay tax upon benefits which are equivalent to a corporate distribution
of surplus. For example, if a shareholder borrows funds from the
corporation with no intention of paying them back, the amount
borrowed may be taxed as a constructive dividend.' 3 The mere fact
that minority stockholders have not participated in the borrowing will
not prevent the courts from finding a distribution in the nature of a
dividend. 4
Some of the early decisions in the insurance area used the
constructive dividend theory to tax the corporate payment of pre-
miums to the shareholder. In Paramount-Richards Theatres Inc. v.
Commissioner"5 a contract was entered into under which insurance
was purchased at corporate expense on the life of a particular share-
holder who was permitted to designate the beneficiaries of the policy
in exchange for his promise that on his death his stock would become
the property of the surviving shareholders. The court in that case
held that each premium payment constituted a taxable dividend to the
shareholder-insured.' 6
Other early cases held that corporate expenditures conferring
tangible economic benefits upon an employee were intended to be
compensation for services and thus taxable as such to the employee.1'7
13 Chattanooga Savings Bank v. Brewer, 17 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1927). See also
Allen v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1941) and Hadley v. Commissioner, 36
F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1929) to the same effect.
14 Christopher v. Burnet, 55 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1931). Manheimer, "Insurance To
Fund Stock-Retirement and Buy-And-Sell Agreements," 341 Ins. LJ. 414 (1951) a
constructive dividend was defined as follows: "Any disposition of corporate earnings
other than a formal dividend distribution, which produces as to one or more share-
holders, a result substantially the same as a formal dividend declaration."
15 153 F.2d 602 (Sth Cir. 1946). The court went on to say that by allowing the
stockholder to designate the beneficiary the corporation surrenders sufficient control
over the property to make it of direct benefit to the stockholder. See also Casper Ranger
Constr. Co., 1 B.T.A. 942 (1925).
16 For other decisions establishing that premium payments by a corporation on
a life insurance policy on the life of a shareholder are income to the shareholder if he
is permitted to designate the beneficiary and no benefit accrues to the corporation see
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933); Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926);
N. Loring Danforth, 18 B.T.A. 1221 (1930); George M. Adams, 18 B.T.A. 381 (1929);
Berizzi Brothers Co., 16 B.TA. 1307 (1929).
'7 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Chandler v. Corn-
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This reasoning has also been applied to the corporate purchased
insurance premium for the benefit of an employee of the corporation.
If a corporation pays the premiums on insurance on one of its em-
ployee's life, the employee has the sole right to appoint the beneficiary,
and the corporation does not have any interest in the policy, the
payment of each premium represents taxable compensation to the
employee. 8
In 1957 and 1958 three court of appeals cases were decided in
this area, two reversing the Tax Court and the other reversing a
district court. All three cases arrived at the conclusion that the
corporate payment of premiums for life insurance on the life of a
shareholder is not taxable income to the shareholder. The three cases
have done much to clarify the law in this area and thus merit indi-
vidual attention.
Casale v. Commissioner0 involved a deferred compensation
agreement funded by life insurance on the life of the president and
owner of 98% of the stock of a corporation. On the same day the
deferred compensation agreement was made the corporation applied
to an insurance company for a $50,000 life policy insuring the presi-
dent's life for the benefit of the corporation, and the insurance com-
pany later issued the policy providing for an annual premium pay-
ment of $6,839.50. The policy also provided that the corporation was
the owner of the policy and entitled to death benefits under it and that
on maturity of the policy thirteen years later when the president
reached 65, he should receive a monthly income payment of $500 for
life or for a ten-year period whichever was longer. The corporation
had the right to assign the policy, to change the beneficiary, to receive
dividends, and to borrow on the policy. The Tax Court held that in
view of the insured's complete domination of the company, retention
by the corporation of various policy rights was meaningless, and that
the real benefit of the policy flowed immediately to the insured so that
the premiums at the time of payment should be taxed to him as
dividends.2" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax
missioner, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941) (taxpayer lived on corporate property without
paying any rent); J. H. McEwen, 6 T.C. 1018 (1946) (corporation made contributions
to trust fund set up to take care of taxpayer in his declining years).
18 Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1937); Yuengling v. Commissioner,
69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1934); N. Loring Danforth, supra note 16; George M. Adams,
supra note 16.
19 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
20 Oreste Casale, 26 T.C. 1020, 1025 (1956). The Tax Court stated:
"Considering the features of the policy in conjunction with the provisions of
the compensation agreement, we must conclude that the corporation was no
more than a conduit running from insurer to petitioner, or his beneficiaries, with
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Court and held that the annual premium paid by the corporation was
not a distribution by the corporation to the president of a taxable
dividend in the year of payment. The court reasoned that the policy
was a corporate asset subject to the claims of other creditors along
with the insured, and, thus, the insured taxpayer received no im-
mediate personal benefit but only a future contingent benefit. The
opinion closed with the following words: "We have been cited to no case
or legislative provision which supports the proposition that the entity of
a corporation which is actively engaged in a commercial enterprise
may be disregarded for tax purposes merely because it is wholly
owned or controlled by a single person.""
Prunier v. Commissioner2 involved a stock purchase agreement
between two brothers and a corporation. Each brother was named as
beneficiary in the policies on the life of the other and yet the proceeds
were to be used to acquire the stock for the corporation. The brothers
each retained the right to change beneficiaries. The Tax Court held
that the surviving brother and not the corporation would be the real
beneficiary and thus the premiums should be taxed as dividends when
paid.2 3 The Tax Court was again reversed, this time by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals. This court reasoned that the real beneficial
owner was the corporation since under the state law the corporation
was entitled to the proceeds after paying the premiums even if the
brothers were nominally the beneficiaries. The court recognized that
corporate rights and benefits must be treated separately from stock-
holder rights and benefits for tax purposes. 4
Sanders v. Fox involved a stock redemption agreement funded
by life insurance. There were four stockholders in the corporation,
and insurance policies were taken out on their lives nearly proportion-
ate in amount to the corporate interest of each stockholder. The
respect to any payments which might come due under the insurance contract.
Essentially petitioner stood in the same relationship to the policy as if he
had taken it out himself and the corporation had paid the premiums for him.
The similarity in terms between the policy and compensation agreement afford
recourse to no other conclusion."
21 Casale v. Commissioner, supra note 19, at 445.
22 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957).
23 Henry E. Prunier, 28 T.C. 19 (1957). The Tax Court reasoned that the corpora-
tion derived no benefit from the agreement in that its indebtedness to creditors remained
undiminished. The Court felt that the entire benefit would be derived by the surviving
brother whose proportional interest in the corporation would be greatly increased by
the redemption of his brother's stock.
24 The court relied upon the Casale case, supra note 19 as authority for its con-
clusion.
25 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958).
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policies were deposited with the corporation with all lifetime benefits
reserved to the corporation and the corporation paid the premiums on
the policies. Each shareholder deposited with the corporation his
corporate stock, endorsed in blank but without surrender of the right
to sell or vote the stock or receive dividends on it. The shareholder
had the exclusive right to name the beneficiary of the insurance
proceeds payable at death. On the death of a stockholder the corpora-
tion was to acquire his stock for a price to be fixed under a formula in
the agreement, with the proceeds of the policy on such stockholder's
life to be applied against such price. In no event was the designated
beneficiary to receive less than the proceeds of the policy 6 The
district court held that in effect the stockholders were the corpora-
tion, that benefits flowed to both the corporation and the shareholder
from payment of the premiums, and that the premiums should be
regarded as dividends. The Tenth Circuit reversed and held that pay-
ment of the premiums was not a constructive dividend to the share-
holders. The court distinguished between the situation where a corpo-
ration pays premiums on a policy owned by the corporation, and the
situation where a corporation pays premiums on a policy owned by the
insured (who also designates the beneficiary); only in the latter case
does payment of premiums constitute taxable income to the share-
holder. The court found no present taxable benefit to the stockholders,
pointing out that the stock must be given up in order for the beneficiary
to receive the proceeds; the situation was just as if the corporation
had agreed to pay a fixed amount on a stockholder's death to his
nominee in exchange for the stock and had named itself as beneficiary
of the policy.28
The rationale of the three cases seems to be based upon the
principle of ownership. As long as the corporation retains all the
incidents of ownership in the policy the shareholder receives no
benefit at the time premiums are being paid by the corporation. The
policy is an asset of the corporation and is subject to the claims of
creditors so that the shareholder enjoys only a future contingent
benefit which should not be taxable when premiums are paid.
As pointed out previously, the stock redemption plan funded
by life insurance has both corporate purposes and shareholder pur-
26 For specific policy provisions see 263 F.2d 857, 858 (10th Cir. 1958).
27 Sanders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957).
28 It is true that because the stockholder is guaranteed a minimum sales price
for the stock, the stockholder may ultimately benefit considerably from the
policy and agreement, but the amount of gain, if any, can only be evaluated
at that time. During the contemplated life of the policy, the only realizable
value, the benefits accruing to the owner of the policy, is with the corporation.
Sanders v. Fox, supra note 25, at 861.
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poses.29 Whatever benefits a close corporation, however, is likely to
also benefit its shareholders. At any rate it is now clear that the re-
demption of closely held corporate stock under stock purchase agree-
ments, in the absence of special circumstances," will be considered a
genuine corporate activity furthering continuity of management and
ownership.31
The Internal Revenue Service expressly approved the three pre-
viously discussed decisions in a 1959 ruling.' It was stated in the ruling
that the payment of premiums by the corporation is an independent
act by the corporation by which it converts one asset into another
asset and such action has no relationship to the receipt of taxable
income by the shareholder.3
29 In Emeloid v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1951) the court had
this to say on the subject of corporate purpose:
Petitioner apparently anticipated that, should one of its key shareholder-officers
die, those beneficially interested in his estate might enter into active participa-
tion in corporate affairs and possibly introduce an element of friction. Or his
estate not being bound by contract to sell the stock to the petitioner, might
sell it to adverse interests. The fragile bark of a small business can be wrecked
on just such unchartered shoals.
30 For cases where those special circumstances existed see Wall v. United States,
264 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947) (corporation merely fulfilling personal obligation of a
shareholder) ; Pelton Steel Castings Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958);
George D. Mann, 33 B.T.A. 281 (1935); Ruphane B. Iverson, 29 B.T.A. 863 (1934).
31 Emeloid v. Commissioner, supra note 29; Edgar M. Docherty, 47 B.T.A. 462
(1942); Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939); Fred F. Fischer, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
520 (1947). Another argument which can be made, perhaps a bit less persuasively, in
favor of the nontaxability of the premium payments is based upon the fact that the
premium payments are not deductible by the corporation as ordinary and necessary
expenses of doing business under section 162 of the Code.
32 Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 65. The ruling states:
Where a corporation purchases life insurance on the lives of its stockholders,
the proceeds of which are to be used in payment for the stock of stockholders,
the premiums on such insurance do not constitute income to the stockholder,
even though the stockholder has the right to designate a beneficiary, provided
such right of the beneficiary to receive the proceeds is conditioned upon the
transfer of the corporate stock to the corporation.
The decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals in the cases of Casale
v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440, Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818, and
Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855, involving similar factual situations, will be fol-
lowed by the Internal Revenue Service.
33 Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 65, 66. In its hypothetical case the ruling
sets up the provisions of a stock redemption agreement from which we find that the
use of insurance to provide funds for the stock redemption may be included in the
agreement. The insured may be given the right to purchase the insurance at its cash
value in the event of a premium default by the corporation. Finally, we find that the
stockholder insured may designate a beneficiary as long as the right of the beneficiary
1962]
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The ruling contains several limitations which should be noticed
by draftsmen. It states that in the case of cross-purchase agreements,
where the stockholders are the owners and beneficiaries under the
policies, premiums paid by the corporation, which is not even a party
to the agreement, will be taxable income to the shareholders.34 The
ruling also states that the obligation to purchase the stock must be
solely the obligation of the corporation and not the obligation of the
shareholder taken over by the corporation.35
The cases and the ruling seem to make clear what has to be done
in order to avoid dividend treatment of premiums paid by a corpora-
tion on life insurance used to fund stock redemption agreements. 36
UNREASONABLE ACCUMULATION OF EARNINGS
Another pitfall to avoid is the penalty tax imposed under sec-
tions 531 to 537 of the Internal Revenue Code on corporations which
unreasonably accumulate income in order to avoid taxes to the share-
holders. Accumulation of income beyond the reasonable needs of the
business will establish the purpose of avoiding income tax unless the
corporation proves to the contrary by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.37
Will the carrying of insurance to fund buy-sell agreements be
considered an unreasonable accumulation of income not related to
the business needs of the corporation and thus subject the corporation
to receive the proceeds is conditioned upon his duty to transfer the stock to the corpora-
tion. These rights may be given the insured without risk of dividend treatment on the
premium payments by the corporation.
The ruling also approved the trusteed type of plan and said it would not be given
dividend treatment on payment of premiums by the corporation.
34 In support of this conclusion the ruling cites Doran v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d
934 (9th Cir. 1957).
35 The ruling cites Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947) as support
for the proposition that an individual is taxable when the corporation assumes his
personal obligation.
36 For a case involving the problem of constructive dividends in the key man in-
surance area, see Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d (6th Cir. 1959), not. acq. Rev.
Rul. 61-134 1961 Int. Rev. Bull., No. 29, at 20.
37 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 533. Under section 534 the burden of proof is supposed
to shift to the commissioner on the issue of unreasonable accumulation of income if the
corporation has submitted a statement of the grounds on which it relies to establish
that any part of the earnings were not permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business. The Tax Court has not followed this provision in the past. The
recent case of Gsell v. Commissioner may, however, indicate a new trend.
Under section 531 the tax imposed is 27Y2% of the first $100,000 of earnings un-
reasonably accumulated in the taxable year and 38Y2% on the excess.
Under section 535(c) (2) the corporation can accumulate $100,000 over the years
before it will be subject to attack by the tax authorities.
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to the penalty tax under section 531? Previous cases have held that
agreements for the redemption of stock serve a legitimate corporate
purpose." The Pelton Steel Casting case 9 suggests that "business
needs" under section 531 may be a somewhat narrower concept than
corporate purpose as established by the older cases not dealing with
section 531.
In Pelton the corporation redeemed the stock of living share-
holders owning 80% of the stock in the corporation making it more
difficult to show that the acquisition served the purpose of continuity
of management which is usually the case when the stock of a deceased
stockholder is redeemed. The Tax Court, which was later affirmed by
the court of appeals, emphasized the distinction between purchasing
a majority interest and purchasing a minority interest.40
The Pelton case should not be extended beyond its facts to the
stock purchase agreements funded by life insurance. The latter type
of agreements serve definite business needs such as continuity of man-
agement, improvement of employee morale, confidence of creditors,
and avoidance of inexperienced ownership among others.4 If it is
agreed that the stock purchase agreements are a "reasonable need" of
the business, then the accumulation of earnings to finance the plan
through the purchase of insurance policies should not be considered as
an avoidance of taxes to the shareholders.
Actually the use of insurance to fund stock purchase agreements
may decrease the risk of a penalty tax under section 531 since it is
not necessary to accumulate as much income to provide for the con-
tingency of a premature death when the corporation has insurance
on the life of the stockholder as it is when the corporation must ac-
cumulate the cash to meet this contingency.4'
REDEMPTION PRICE AS DIVIDEND TO SURVIVING SHAREHOLDERS
In Sanders v. Fox the majority opinion closed with a rather fore-
boding comment: "Upon the death or withdrawal of a stockholder, tax
complications, including the possibility of an assessment of construc-
38 See cases cited supra note 31.
39 Pelton Steel Castings Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958).
40 Pelton Steel Castings Co., 28 T.C. 153 (1957). The Tax Court distinguished
prior cases such as Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, 103 F. Supp. 779 (D.C. Ark., 1952)
and Dill Man. Co., 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939), where stock of minority shareholders was
redeemed to maintain the management policy of the majority and to prevent the sale
of minority interests to outsiders.
41 Manheimer and Friedman, "Stock-Retirement Agreements," 28 Taxes 423 (1950).
42 For further discussion see, Altman, "Corporate Accumulation of Earnings," 36
Taxes 933 (1958).
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five dividends may arise, but the solution of these dimly-foreseen
and nebulous problems must await a clearer view. ')43
In the case of Holsey v. Commissione 4 the taxpayer owned
50% of the outstanding stock of a corporation and had an option to
purchase the other 50%. The taxpayer assigned the option to the
corporation which redeemed the other 50%, thus making the taxpayer
a 100% stockholder. There was no life insurance involved in this
case, but the case is relevant for the purposes of this article because
this type of agreement is often funded by life insurance. The Tax
Court held that the redemption by the corporation was essentially
equivalent to a dividend to the remaining stockholders on the ground
that solely a personal purpose and not a corporate purpose was served
by redemption of the stock.
45
The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that the re-
demption by the corporation was not a dividend to the remaining
sole shareholder. The court reasoned that this case was distinguishable
from a case where the corporation assumes an obligation of a share-
holder because here the shareholder was never under any legal obliga-
tion to purchase the stock but merely had an option to purchase it.46
In 1958 the Internal Revenue Service expressed approval of the
court of appeals decision in the Holsey case.47 The Holsey case and
the ruling following it seem to reach the proper result, despite the
fact that the proportionate interests of the remaining shareholders
are increased, because the assets of the corporation have been re-
duced by the purchase of the stock.
43 Sanders v. Fox, supra note 25, at 861.
44 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958).
45 Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957). That purpose was to make the taxpayer
the sole shareholder of the corporation.
46 The court also stated that the percentage interest of the shareholder changed
from 50% to 100% thus making this look different from the situation where a true
dividend is paid and the proportionate interests remain unchanged. Finally the court
agreed that the stockholder benefited indirectly by his increased proportionate interest
in the corporation but said that this would not give rise to taxable income until the
corporation makes a distribution to the stockholder or until his stock is sold.
47 Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 920. The ruling stated that an increase in
the proportionate interest of the remaining shareholder does not necessarily mean the
redemption price will be taxable income to him.
The ruling closes with the admonition that there will be a gift or compensation to
the remaining shareholders if the stock is purchased for less than fair market value.
The court in the Holsey case did not explore this possibility even though the redemption
was for less than book value. It would seem that the ruling restricts Holsey to this
extent. The converse of this proposition is also true in that if the corporation pays
more than the fair market value of the stock the result will be a compensation or a
gift to the shareholder surrendering his stock.
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A later ruling48 has applied the reasoning of Holsey to stock re-
demption from the estate of a deceased stockholder. The ruling does
not state that the plan was funded by life insurance but the principles
are equally applicable to a plan funded by life insurance and thus
are relevant for the purposes of this article. The ruling states that
two brothers each owned 50% of the stock of a corporation. They
entered a stock redemption agreement which provided that upon the
death of either stockholder, the survivor would either purchase the
stock of the deceased at its fair market value within six months, or
vote his stock for dissolution and liquidation of the corporation. One
of the brothers died and the other brother and the representative of
the deceased brother decided to have the corporation purchase the
shares held by the estate for business reasons. Since the surviving
brother at no time possessed the shares of stock redeemed from the
deceased brother's estate, the ruling concludes that a redemption by
the corporation of the stock of the deceased brother from his estate
did not constitute a constructive dividend to the remaining brother.
In the normal stock redemption agreement of the entity type,
funded by life insurance, there will be no question that the corpora-
tion itself has the obligation to purchase the stock from the estate
of the deceased stockholder, so it is clear that there will be no problem
of dividend treatment to the surviving stockholder. The corporation
in the ruling relieved the surviving shareholder of his personal obliga-
tion so that the ruling goes even further in disallowing dividend treat-
ment than is necessary in the case of most stock purchase agreements
funded by life insurance.4
TAXABILITY OF SELLING STOCKHOLDER's ESTATE
A redemption by the corporation will not result in ordinary
income treatment to the estate which sells its stock to the corporation
as long as any one of three requirements is met under section 302 of
the Code. There will be ordinarily no tax to the estate"0 if the redemp-
tion is not essentially equivalent to a dividend,5 if the redemption is
43 Rev. Rul. 59-286, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 103.
49 The ruling distinguished its own set of facts from the Wall case, supra note 35
on the ground that in the Wall case the taxpayer had purchased the stock of the other
stockholder at the time his personal note was satisfied by the corporation in return for
the stock.
50 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1001 provides for recognition of gain to the extent
of the excess of the proceeds over the basis of the stock. But since the amount received
will ordinarily fix the fair market value of the stock at date of death, which in turn
fixes the basis of the stock in the hands of the estate under § 1014, the recognized gain
will be zero.
51 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 302(b) (1).
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substantially disproportionate,52 or if the redemption completely termi-
nates the interest of the estate in the corporation.53
There were many cases under the 1939 Code discussing when a
redemption was "essentially equivalent to a dividend." The cases re-
veal that the redemption was not treated as "essentially equivalent
to a dividend" where the corporation had a good business purpose for
distributing its assets54 or the result of the redemption was to change
substantially the relative position of a stockholder in regard to the
other stockholders.55
It is assumed that the same tests for determining when a redemp-
tion is not essentially equivalent to a dividend apply under the 1954
Code except for the important change that the attribution rules of
section 318 now apply to this part of section 302.16 These tests lack
clarity and it is felt by at least one writer that the importance of the
section 302 (b) (1) "essentially equivalent" requirement will be greatly
diminished by the use of the clear requirements for capital gain treat-
ment under section 302 (b) (2) and (3).57
Under section 302(b) (3) of the Code, as has been stated above,
if a shareholder's interest in the corporation is completely terminated
by the redemption of his shares, the receipt of the proceeds of the
redemption will be treated as a sale or exchange of his stock. This is
a clear test and the only obstacles to meeting it are the attribution
rules of section 318 of the Code.5
52 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 302(b) (2). There are primarily three requirements which
must be met in order to escape dividend treatment on a redemption under the "sub-
stantially disproportionate" test. The proportionate share of the voting stock owned
by the shareholder immediately after the redemption must be less than 80% of the
proportionate share owned immediately before the redemption. The 80% rule applies
also to the proportion of the common stock (voting and non-voting) owned by the
shareholder immediately before and after the redemption. Finally, immediately after
the redemption the shareholder must own less than 50% of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.
There is also a fourth minor requirement under section 302(b) (2) (D) that the
redemption is not one of a planned series resulting in the aggregate in a substantially
disproportionate distribution.
53 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 302(b)(3).
54 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Site,
177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949).
55 Commissioner v. Roberts, 203 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1953); Kirschenbaum v. Com-
missioner, 155 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1946); Smith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692 (3d Cir.
1941). See also Samuel H. Kessner, 26 T.C. 1046 (1956) for a discussion of both tests.
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
57 See Roeder, "Distributions in Redemption of Stock," N.Y.U. 15th Inst. on Fed.
Tax 475 (1957). For a contrary view see Laikin, "Stock Redemptions: Sections 302 and
318," N.Y.U. 14th Inst. on Fed. Tax 671 (1955).
58 See Roeder, supra note 57, at 480 for a discussion of the attribution rules.
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The attribution rule which most directly effects the subject of
inquiry is section 318(a) (2) (A).19 Under this provision the bene-
ficiary and the estate are treated as one for the purposes of determin-
ing the tax ramifications of a stock redemption. An example will be
helpful to illustrate how the section works. If a corporation has 100
shares, 50 owned by the father and 50 owned by the son, and the
father dies with the corporation redeeming the 50 shares from his
estate, this will not qualify as a complete termination of the estate's
interest, assuming that the son is a beneficiary of the father's estate.
The stock of the son is combined with the stock of the estate; thus,
the estate has sold out only 50% of its interest. The estate owns 100
of the shares both before and after the redemption (counting the
shares owned by the son) so the plan will also fail under "substantially
disproportionate" provisions.60
Dividend treatment will result in the entire redemption price
being taxable as ordinary income to the estate assuming sufficient
earnings and profits under section 316 of the Code, and thus in many
cases will completely destroy the effectiveness of the stock redemption
agreement. There have been several suggested ways to circumvent
the attribution rules and thus attain capital gain treatment and prob-
ably no tax on the basis of a complete sell-out. One suggestion fre-
quently made to sidestep the father-son situation is to provide for
payment of the son's legacy prior to the redemption in the father's
will. Another suggestion has been to bypass the son and provide for
the children of the son in the will but this raises the unanswered
question of whether or not the stock of the son will be attributed to
the children and then to the estate. Or the father can provide for the
son in ways that will not result in the son being a beneficiary such as
joint ownership, life insurance or an inter-vivos trust. 1 Another sug-
gested method of avoiding the attribution rules is for the father and
59 This section reads as follows:
Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a partnership or estate shall be
considered as being owned proportionately by its partners or beneficiaries. Stock
owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a partner or a beneficiary of an estate
shall be considered as being owned by the partnership or estate.
60 Rev. Rul. 56-103, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 159 reached the same result. The ruling
stated that the absence of a plan to avoid tax was not decisive and also that the fact
of an agreement between the corporation and the decedent had no significance in deter-
mining whether or not the redemption was essentially equivalent to a dividend.
61 Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 318(a) (2) (B) the constructive ownership rules
will not be applied if the beneficiary's interest in the trust is a remote contingent in-
terest. The beneficiary's interest is remote if it is 5% or less of the value of the trust
property. Whether or not an interest is contingent will probably be governed by local
law.
1962]
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son to enter a cross-purchase agreement under which the son himself
buys the stock from the father's estate.2
It might be mentioned in passing that regardless of the attribu-
tion rules, at least partial relief can often be obtained under section
303 of the Code. If the federal estate tax value of the stock is equal
to at least 35% of the gross estate, or 50% of the taxable estate of
the deceased stockholder, the estate qualifies for non-dividend treat-
ment under section 303. Under this section there may be redeemed
with complete dividend immunity sufficient stock to pay the estate
and inheritance taxes, and the funeral and administration expenses
of the deceased stockholder. 3 This can be a substantial benefit, but
in many cases dividend treatment on redemption proceeds is a serious
risk and every stock redemption plan should be drafted with an eye
toward this limitation.
REDEMPTION PRICE As ESTATE TAX VALUATION
It is generally assumed that the price paid for the stock on
redemption will fix the valuation of the stock for federal estate tax
purposes. This is not necessarily true and there are some fairly
definite rules to be followed in order to insure that the price set will
be used for purposes of estate tax valuation.64
In order for the agreed price to be binding on the Internal
Revenue Service, there must be restrictions on the right of the owner
of the stock to transfer it during his life.es Furthermore, the stock-
purchase agreement must bind the estate to sell at death if the pur-
chaser desires to purchase the stock. Giving the purchaser a right of
first refusal is not enough if the estate is not obligated to sell the
stock.66 The estate tax regulations provide that the agreement must
be the result of arm's-length dealing and requires consideration in
money or money's worth.67
The sufficiency of consideration is measured at the time of the
62 See Friedman and Wheeler, Jr., "Stock Redemption Agreements Funded by
Life Insurance," 37 Taxes 915, 921 (1959).
63 For a discussion of section 303, see Lanahan, "Redemptions to Pay Death Taxes:
Redemptions Through the Use of Related Corporations (Sections 303, 304)," N.Y.U.
15th Inst. on Fed. Tax 493 (1957).
64 For a comprehensive discussion of this problem see Comment, "The Use of Life
Insurance To Fund Agreements Providing for Disposition of a Business Interest at
Death," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 687, 690 (1958).
65 Estate of James H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944), acq. 1944-1 Cum. Bull. 19;
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
66 Michigan Trust Co., 27 B.T.A. 556 (1933).
67 Treas. Reg. § 20.2301-2(h) (1958). The consideration is presumed to exist be-
tween strangers but it will not be presumed to exist in dealings between the decedent
and the natural objects of his bounty.
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agreement so that it is not decisive if a difference exists between the
price set and the market value of the stock at the time of death."
However, a great disparity may show lack of good faith at the date
of execution, and for this reason a clause providing for periodic re-
evaluation should be inserted or the formula method of price setting
should be used. This is especially true if related parties are involved
since transactions between them will always be scrutinized more care-
fully.69
If the requirements mentioned are followed at the time the agree-
ment is drawn up, the value set by the stock purchase agreement
should be determinative of the stock value for estate tax purposes.
STATE LAW PROBLEMS
It should be noted in passing that before consummating a stock
redemption plan state laws should be consulted for statutory pro-
visions or case law in the areas of insurable interest70 and the right
of a corporation to purchase its own stock."
In general it is stated that a corporation has an insurable in-
terest in the lives of its officers especially if they are persons upon
whom the business is dependent for its continued success.72 Several
cases may still be found, however, holding that a corporation has no
insurable interest in its officers or directors.73
Now only a few jurisdictions still retain the minority rule for-
bidding a corporation to purchase its own stock. 4
The majority of American courts have taken the view that a
solvent corporation may purchase and hold its own stock without
68 Edith M. Bensel, 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938);
Treas. Reg., supra note 67.
69 Edith M. Bensel, supra note 68.
70 See generally 2 Appleman, "Insurance Law and Practice," §§ 871, 872 (1941, Supp.
1957).
71 See G. A. Fletcher, 'Private Corporations," §§ 2845-61 (perm. ed. rev. repl.
1950).
72 Kecdey v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 O.S. 213, 99 N.E. 299 (1912). For cases from
other jurisdictions see Appleman, supra note 70, at 260.
73 Victor v. Louise Cotton Mills, 148 N.C. 107, 61 S.E. 648 (1908) (holding that
corporation has no insurable interest in its president). Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
J. M. Schott & Sons, Co., 30 O.C.C. 656 (1909) (holding corporation has no insurable
interest in its director). A later Ohio case, however, has upheld a corporate owned
key-man life insurance policy on the life of the President. Finney v. Hinkle, 106 Ohio
App. 89, 153 N.E.2d 699 (1958). See also Keckley, supra note 72 which in effect over-
rules the earlier 1909 Ohio case by holding that a corporation has an insurable interest
in a person who is the owner of a large portion of the stock of the corporation.
74 Latulippe v. New England Invest. Co., 77 N.Y. 31, 86 AUt. 361 (1913); Pace v.
Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 132, 59 P.2d 1 (1936).
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authority, in the absence of express restrictions, provided it acts
in good faith and without prejudice to the rights of creditors and has
a surplus with which to make the purchase.7"
CONCLUSION
There are certain precautions which must be observed in the
area of stock-purchase agreements funded by life insurance. The law
is fairly clear and this is all the more reason for following it to the
letter both in the planning stage and in the drafting stage.
The corporation should have a valid business purpose for pur-
chasing the stock and this purpose should be recorded in the corporate
minutes. If the corporation gives the insured the right to choose a
beneficiary, the corporation should reserve the right to change the
beneficiary and should also retain all other incidents of ownership in
the policy. The corporation should set the insurance up as an asset
subject to the claims of creditors. If at all possible the redemption
should be arranged so that it does not result in dividend treatment to
the estate under section 302. The agreement should be integrated
with other planning devices so as to avoid the attribution rules of
section 318 of the Code. This checklist is not intended to be exhaus-
tive but only to mention some of the more obvious problems. 76
The tax problems of a stock purchase agreement are increased
when the entity plan is used rather than the cross-purchase plan, but
in many cases the practicalities of the situation require the corpora-
tion to be the purchaser of the stock. In the present state of the law
the corporate buy-out plan will in most cases be perfectly feasible.
However, there are many tax pitfalls which must be recognized at the
outset in order to avoid disastrous results.
Benjamin L. Zox
75 See Fletcher, supra note 71, at 364. The governing Ohio statute is Ohio Rev.
Code § 1701.35, subdivision B of which states as follows:
A corporation shall not purchase its own shares except as provided in this
section, or if after such purchase its assets would be less than its liabilities
plus stated capital, or if the corporation is insolvent, or if there is reasonable
ground to believe that by such person it would be rendered insolvent.
See subsection A for the restrictions on a corporation buying its own stock.
76 See Worthy, "Current Developments in Federal Taxation Affecting Life In-
surance," A.B.A. Sect. Ins. N. & C. L. 142 (1958), for a more complete list of precau-
tions to take in preparing stock-purchase agreements funded by life insurance.
